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Small Group Research
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Understanding the Sources of Faulty Group Decision Making

A Lesson from the Challenger Disaster

Randy Y. Hirokawa

University of Iowa

Dennis S. Gouran

Pennsylvania State University

Amy E. Martz

Pennsylvania State University

Nearly two years after the Rogers Commission investigation of the Challenger disaster revealed that the decision to launch the shuttle was made in the presence of information questioning the safety of the launch, many continue to ask how NASA officials could make such a highly questionable and regrettable decision. The present essay examines this ques tion and identifies six major factors that exerted an influence on the decision-making pro cess and ultimately led to the launch of the Challenger. These factors include (1) faulty shared beliefs held by Level III decision makers, (2) questionable reasoning displayed by Level II and III decision makers, (3) perceived pressure experienced by Level IV personnel, (4) shift in presumption in favor of the launch, (5) ineffective persuasive attempts by Level IV per sonnel, and (6) use of ambiguous language by Level IV personnel. The essay concludes that the decision to launch the Challenger was the result of a complex interplay among a num ber of cognitive, psychological, and social forces constituting the decision environment.

Small Group Research, Vol. 19, No. 4, 411-433 (1988)
DOI: 10.1177/104649648801900401
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